The Legal Ethics of Belonging by Shaffer, Thomas L.
The Legal Ethics of Belonging
THOMAS L. SHAFFER*
It is noteworthy that the story of Hagar and Ishmael is the Reading for the First Day of Rosh
Hashanah; while the next chapter, the intended Sacrifice of Isaac, is read on the Second Day.
The highest manifestation of the Divine is not to be found in the calling into existence of
Nature's elemental forces; far higher are God's ways manifest in the hearts and souls of men,
in the home life of those who do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly with their God.
I. THE LEGAL ETmICS OF PARTICIPATION
Socrates went around Athens telling law teachers and law students that their
highest concern should be to be good people. And, he said, the next and consequent
concern of the profession should be to show the citizens of Athens how to be good
people. For Socrates, as for virtually all of classical moral philosophy and much of
Jewish and Christian moral theology, ethical discussion is discussion about the good
person. When we talk about Aristotle's man of practical wisdom, or when we talk
about heroes, saints, role models, paragons, or professional examplars, it is the good
person we are talking about. The ethics that supports such moral talk is founded in
disciplined curiosity about the good person. In this way, traditional ethics informed
those who taught the young. It showed teachers how to hold up the good person as
a coherent object of admiration and a coherent source of moral standards.
There is a difference between the good person, as a source of moral standards,
and ethical reflection on right and wrong actions. The difference is of considerable
importance to modern professional ethics-to legal ethics, I think. Our little corner
of the modern academic enterprise hardly knows what to say about good people. It
hardly knows, and so it says nothing about goodness but a lot about freedom and
autonomy.
Virtually no one talks about clients as good people. The assumptions in legal
ethics are that the most lawyers can want for their clients is isolation and
independence; that clients want lawyers to do wrong actions; that many lawyers obey
their clients and do wrong actions for them; and that what legal ethics is about is
whether lawyers should refuse to do the wrong actions clients want them to do.
So much for clients being good people. What about lawyers being good people?
Most of us who make our living from professional ethics do not study or write about
or teach about good lawyers. We write, study, and teach about the acts of abstract,
depersonalized lawyers: right acts and wrong acts, and whether certain hypothetical
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acts are right or wrong. Not people who are described or imagined, but acts of people
who are treated as if they do not have personalities. In this way of thinking, an act
is considered interesting for ethics because an act is the result of a choice; a choice
is interesting because it is the result of a quandary-a dilemma. This kind of ethics
pauses over dilemmas. So common is the presentation of the dilemma as a device for
discussion in our subject that the phrase "ethical dilemma" is spoken as if it were one
word.
Legal ethics presents some remarkably crude manifestations of the exaggeration
of acts, choices, and quandaries, but the condition is general in most academic
consideration of morals. Consideration of goodness (which is a characteristic of
people) is obscured by consideration of rightness (which is a characteristic of acts).
An act is right or wrong, and if what you study in ethics is right and wrong, you will
study acts, the choices that produce acts, and the quandaries that produce choices.
Then, if you are a standard-issue professional-responsibility teacher, you will stop.
You will, then, have behaved as if a human being is a chooser. It is not interesting
to ask what makes a human being what he is, or to seek his particular moral quality.
Ethics is defined and confined to choices. Whatever it is that prepares a person for
choices will be beyond the stopping place, beyond the ken of legal ethics.
For all practical purposes, an act-based ethic defines the person as the result of
choices. Choices are the products of quandaries. Ethics on this model often does not
ask where the quandaries come from. And act-based ethics shows less interest than
you might expect in the poetic suggestion that human choice is inexplicable, in the
mystery of what a human person is, in how a human person comes to be what she is,
or in how she might become something else. The concern of classical ethics,
theology, and literature for the good person has become more or less irrelevant for
legal ethics. What legal ethics is concerned about is the right act.
We who make our living from "professional responsibility" benefit from this
fixation. That is probably why there is such a fixation. Teaching act-based ethics is
like teaching the law of property: When you finally master the rule against
perpetuities, you oppose repealing the rule. You might even write a law review
article, as the late Professor Lewis Simes did, entitled "Is The Rule Against
Perpetuities Doomed?" 2 Focusing on the act in ethics has familiar comfort for us, and
it provides a number of tactical advantages. For example, focusing on acts lets a
scholar use people interchangeably-as if they were, for purposes of ethics, all alike.
If people are defined as choosers, they are not as interesting as their choices. We
teachers then encompass our subject, as the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination does, with machine-graded, multiple-choice questions.
We pose subjects for classroom discussion in the form of "cases" or
"problems" in which people can be represented, as they are in property casebooks,
with letters: A, an attorney, represents C, a client, in a personal-injury lawsuit against
D, a manufacturer of electric heaters, who is represented by L, a second lawyer, and
so on. Our subject, thus brought under control, is marketable. Its principles are
2. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "'Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 MiCm. L. REv. 179 (1953).
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reduced to codes. It is written about in generic law review articles in which the
subject is not people but public policy. It is examined nationally, in terms that divert
the gaze from the quirky little differences we find in those we know. This generality
allows us, then, to talk of ethics in terms of principle; we can talk about what lawyers
do for and with people as "the administration of justice," for example. Acts push
people into the background, a circumstance that works well for our lesson plans and
our test questions.
We do not deny, in our subject, that the person is significant. Even teachers of
legal ethics read, see, hear, and tell stories about persons. But one person will do as
well as another for law school course work, including legal ethics. We seem to have
decided that it is an incoherent question (or might as well be) to ask what a person
is. What is coherent is that a person makes choices-and so "person" is coherent
only as that which makes choices. (What is a choice? It is what a person makes.) The
person who makes choices is then coherent as an example of naked will, and each
naked will is like all the others.
Notice, please, the irony in what has happened to people in this act-centered way
of thinking. They have become fungible, interchangeable with one another, because
we have not been interested in who they are. We have confined our interest to what
they choose. And then, in order to safeguard their choices as objects of our study, we
have separated them from one another-each chooser apart from all other choosers.
Otherwise their choices might not be their own. We have insisted on defining the
excellence of people in terms of separation. Each of them is a chooser, a self-ruling,
free chooser. We have isolated each one. We treat each of them as alone. The person
is, for purposes of our ethics, alone but not unique-a choosing machine that runs
itself.
What I want to try to do in these lectures is to revive the relevance in legal ethics
of the good person. I hope then to be able to consider, in your company, both of us
then being in the company of the revived good person, two questions that modem
American legal ethics seems almost unable to contemplate. One of these questions is
the primacy of human relationships, the fact that we people are connected to one
another, and connected radically (at the roots). We belong. It is not that we belong-
that we are connected-because of our choices, but that we make the choices we do
because we are connected. We belong before we make choices; we make the choices
we make because we belong.
I do not mean anything arcane when I say "belong" or "connected." I mean
ordinary, daily, backyard belonging in neighborhood, town, religious congregation,
and among friends-associations that we choose far less clearly than we think we do;
and family, race, and ethnic group-associations that we do not choose at all. These
two kinds of associations illuminate one another; we learn, by comparing them, that
neither kind of association is the product of choice, that choices are the products of
both kinds of association. I do not mean to deny that we in some way choose our
connections; but I mean to say that we belong before we choose to belong. I mean to
say that belonging is significant whether we choose it or not. We persons are
something more than, deeper than, choosers.
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I mean to argue, as Saul Bellow's Augie March did, that first you are and then
you choose to be, and that this situation is the human condition. We are not primarily
choosers; we are primarily members-and that means we are not alone. "All the
influences were lined up waiting for me," Augie said. "I was born, and there they
were to form me, which is why I tell you more of them than of myself." 3 Augie was
a poor Jewish boy of my generation; he speaks here of growing up in Chicago. He
said:
I know I longed very much, but I didn't understand for what .... Friends, human pals, men
and brethren, there is no brief, digest, or shorthand way to say where it leads. Crusoe, alone
with nature, under heaven, had a busy, complicated time of it with the unhuman itself, and
I am in a crowd that yields results with much more difficulty and reluctance and am part of
it myself.4
The second question I hope to be able to consider with you, after trying to revive
the good person, is whether our moral choices are like the "cases" in our legal-ethics
casebooks. Are our moral choices decisions we make after some neutral mental
agency within each of us establishes the facts and states the considerations? The
common way of "doing" professional ethics poses sets of facts and arguments that
are gathered out of observation and experience and then presented to the will, so that
the will can reach a moral choice on them. I want to suggest to you that our moral
quality is more pervasive than that and that it functions in what we see and remember
and know more radically than it functions in what we choose. If I succeed at opening
up this second question, I will persuade you to nod in agreement at something the
philosopher and story teller Iris Murdoch said:
Will and reason are not entirely separate faculties in the moral agent. Will continually
influences belief, for better or worse, and is ideally able to influence it through a sustained
attention to reality . . . . As moral agents we have to try to see justly, to . . . curb
imagination, to direct reflection. Man is not a combination of an impersonal rational thinker
and a personal will. He is a unified being who sees, and who desires in accordance with what
he sees [who sees in accordance with what he desires], and who has ... control over the
direction and focus of his vision. 5
Seeing is a moral act, she says. Seeing is a moral art.
I am not going to prove any of this. What I am going to try to do is to show you
one kind of human relationship and invite you to notice that our connections
determine the facts we see, or fail to see; the reasons that occur to us; and the choices
we say we are making for ourselves and for our clients. I hope to examine with you
what I want to call the legal ethics of belonging. I hope to rely on your concluding
that our communities prove that we do not act alone-the human person is not an
imperious, autonomous will, a lonely governing self, an isolated individual, choosing
his singular moral way. That is my ambition on the first question. My ambition on
the second question is to show that, as our communities talk us out of the impression
3. S. BELLOW, THE ADVENTuRES OF AUGIE MARC 89 (1953) (Crest ed. 1965).
4. Id.
5. I. Mtmrocii, THE SovREIGTrY OF GOOD 41 (1970) (Ark. ed. 1985).
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of isolation, they will also disprove the notion that our facts and our morals are
separate. 6
Anthropology, the study of what people are, is a place to begin to describe the
ethics of belonging. And, fortunately for me, a recent and compelling piece of
anthropology comes to hand in Carol Greenhouse's study of the Baptists of
"Hopewell," Georgia. Her recent book7 describes the way members of a Baptist
congregation in a suburb of Atlanta deal with their disputes. It is a study ofjustice and
of the home life of those who do justice. Greenhouse looks at morals in a community,
She begins with the common-sense observation that a person's morals come to light
in the way he explains and justifies what he has done. She sees the person not as a
chooser but as an explainer. 8
Greenhouse shows that the critical feature in an explanation of behavior is that
the explainer claims to be in a community. He explains himself by saying what he is;
when he says what he is, he is saying that he belongs in a community. A person
comes up with one explanation rather than another, Greenhouse says, "and thereby
identifies with one group over another.' 9 This way of looking at morals is not novel,
but it is neglected. Greenhouse claims to have found in a modern American
community what Alexis de Toqueville described as the American dream-'"a society
built not on obedience" nor on choice, "but on participation." 10
Greenhouse distinguishes between rule and explanation. Rule relates to act,
choice, and dilemma. Explanation relates to belonging. She talks to one of these
Georgia Baptists and asks him, for example, why he did not stand up for himself in
a family quarrel. He answers by saying it is because he is a Baptist. His explanation
is membership. It comes, Greenhouse says, from a "we-feeling"I--the feeling this
person gets when he looks to the left and to the right and says to himself, "I am one
of these. When I speak of these, I can say we." And thatfeels-if you will pardon
the word-right. It is not the case that I belong because I am right, but, rather, I am
right because I belong.
As Michael Novak explains it, when discussing the ethics of immigrant
communities, this saying "we" is not really a choice; it is not so much the conscious
joining of a group as it is the recognition, often the emotional recognition, that says
I have come home. There has been provoked in me a sense of being at home. First
we remember that we are members; then, in some way or other, we choose to be
members. Choice is secondary.' 2
6. I have attempted this agenda before in Shaffer, The Legal Ethics ofRadical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. Rev. 963
(1987). I aim to develop aspects of a single theme in that essay, these lectures, and my recent article, The Unique, Novel,
and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REv. 697 (1988) [hereinafter Adversary Ethic].
7. C. GREENHOUSE, PRAYINO FOR JusncE-FArni, ORDER, AND Co.muNruYt iN AN AmERiCAN TowN (1986).
8. Id. at 23-37.
9. Id. at 25.
10. Id. (quoting A. DE ToQutvnx , DEsocRAcy N As mcA (G. Lawrence trans. 1969)).
11. Id. (quoting J. HUZMIGA, AMERICA:  DtrrcH HisroRAN's VisioN FRoM, AFAR AND NEAR 277 (H. Rowan trans.
1972)).
12. Id. (discussing HuIZINGA, supra note 11, at 277). See generally D. CARR, ToME, NARRArWE, AND HisrORY
122-52 (1986); GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 23-42. The alternative way of accounting for associations--that they are
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The we-feeling is an emotion. That does not disqualify it from reality, not even
in law school discussion, but it does raise the question of whether the we-feeling is
also rational. Is it something that can be thought about among those who feel it,
something they and we can discuss? Greenhouse and I answer "Yes." We argue that
the we-feeling is an ethical event, as well as a moral event. It accounts for morals by
describing them in terms not of acts, choices, and dilemmas, nor of rules chosen to
govern choices, but in terms of explanation. The we-feeling accounts for and clarifies
morals in terms of explanations for morals. It identifies explanation in terms not of
autonomous, self-governing choices, but in terms of where we belong.
The actions that students of applied ethics describe and ponder are being
described here by one who claims she can "see society's heart in its mind," who
probes "not rules but the ideas that people find compelling and on which they base
[or try to base] their conduct as a matter of course."' 13 These "ideas" are not rules
or laws; they are "normative ideas apart from those backed [by] coercive threats."1 4
They are notions, influences that form persons, as Augie March said, and they are
prior, in time and in potency, to the rules and principles that are backed by deduction,
logic, scripture, or coercive threat. These influences from belonging limit us, but they
are not primarily limits on behavior so much as they are limits on interpretation.' 5
Belonging explains reality.
How do these interpretations seem to come about in a person's consciousness?
They are, Greenhouse says, first "a current of yearning and regret in people's private
lives," and then "understandings of . . .personal responsibilities in their social
relationships." 16 Greenhouse's work is a study of the way justice works. Her way of
describing a person in his community puts Meaning and value on disputes and what
the person in his community does about disputes. This meaning and this value-
which are matters of belonging before they are matters of obeying-are the actor's
and the actor's community's legal anthropology. Greenhouse's work is focused on
dispute resolution. Her insight is that the Baptists of "Hopewell" hold themselves
together in a selective memory "that consists of silencing old disputes" and thus
accounts in significant ways for "the ethic of harmony that silences new ones." 17 Her
anthropological point is that the community's memory' 8 combines with its perception
of order to provide an explanation to members of the community for what they do
created by the choices of their members-can succeed only by ignoring most organic communities, that is, by ignoring
the neighborhoods, families, and religious congregations that most of the time will show us why we do what we do.
13. GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 31.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 33.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 26-27.
18. By memory I mean the way such a community accounts for its past-its collective history. Greenhouse notices
that such a memory is inevitably selective. As much is ignored by the community in its history as is claimed for memory.
See M. Ball, Constitution, Court, and Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 3 (showing that the history of legal
mistreatment of Indians in North America is the product of our (white) culture's selective inattention to original European
injustice). Much of American legal ethics is explained by the fact that our professional forebears said this country was (in
Thomas Jefferson's phrase) "God's New Israel," and that it was as well a nation governed by law and not by men. See
T. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS ch. 5 (1987). The point is sometimes encompassed in discussions of "the
philosophy of history." See generally D. CAR, TWIE, NARRATIvE, AND IsTORY (1986).
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when they quarrel, or refuse to quarrel, with one another. 19 When a person uses such
an explanation he shows himself to be formed by the memory and present order of a
community. He recognizes and explicates his membership. The ethical point I take
from Greenhouse is that such an anthropology gives access to the morals of the
person, access that leads to realities that are descriptions of the person's actions and
of the rules he claims or appears to follow.
Greenhouse was particularly concerned with dispute resolution and therefore
with process and the collective explanation of process, as well as individual
explanation for conflict and the avoidance of conflict. The individual relates to the
collective as the individual claims membership in the collective and by that claim
adopts its ways of explaining both collective and individual behavior.
Greenhouse had an interest in order, in government in the broadest sense. Her
analysis of culture claims to go behind the usual anthropological description of
justice. The usual anthropology describes justice in terms of cases, disputes, and
assertions of rights. Justice brought to bear on cases, disputes, and assertions is
described in terms of rules and bodies of rules. The ethics of belonging (my term, not
Greenhouse's, although I think I am faithful to what she means) claims, even when
the agenda is order in the community, that social life is not organized by rules, but
that rules are constituted by social groups. Rules come from a primary social order.
Rules do not motivate collective behavior-do not motivate even what we lawyers
call procedure-because there can be no rules until there are rule-makers, and
rule-makers cannot come to their rule-making task with uncolored rationality.
I propose to apply Greenhouse's conclusion to legal ethics. There is current and,
as I perceive it, growing effort among legal scholars to make in jurisprudence the
argument Greenhouse makes in anthropology. Sanford Levinson's new book,
Constitutional Faith,20 seems to rest on a perception of belonging in America-
belonging to America, as if America were a community of memory and of
explanation, which explanation is stated in a peculiarly central way in the federal
Constitution. The anthropology for such a claim involves, I suppose, the demonstra-
tion of enduring communal strength in America-the sort of thing Robert Bellah and
his associates claim to have accomplished in their recent Habits of the Heart.21
19. See generally S. HAuERwAs, THE PEACEABLE KiNDo.i: A PRitER as CHRSTAN Enmcs (1983); J. YODER, THE
PRssmy KtNGDOM: SocMA. Ermcs As GosPEL (1984). A theologian might pause here to notice that Carol Greenhouse was
studying a community that claims to be the church, the people of God. From a theological point of view, the fact that the
Baptists of "Hopewell" deny conflict now and explain themselves with an untruthful memory of the conflicts of the past
is dissonant. A theologian would say, I think, that an indication of the church's faithfulness to its mission is its ability
to be truthful about its past and its ability to tell the truth about conflict now. Greenhouse is safely within her discipline
when she looks at "Hopewell" and says that "no culture is without its contradictions"; a theologian would not deny that,
but he could not, in looking at contradictions in the church, ignore the belief of the church that, as Greenhouse describes
it, "God's plan is the history and future of all creation, whose evolution is... proof of God's supreme intelligence."
GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 38. In other words, in reference to both order and memory, there is a theology that says
"Hopewell's" Baptists are able to hear the truth. Greenhouse's book, read by a theologian, might become an unintended
reproach to "Hopewell's" Baptists.
20. S. I.EviSON, COssrrnm=oAL FArm (1988).
21. R. BEsAH, R. MADSEN, W. SuLtaVAN, A. SwNDLER & S. TirroN, HABrrs OF THE HEAR. INDMDUAUsM AND
co.st'm'r u AMERcA. LwE (1985).
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My colleague Steven Hobbs has caused me to think of this "republican"
perception of America in terms of those who have been excluded from participation.
Hobbs is at work on a theory of the Civil Rights Movement which argues that what
the lawyer-reformers of that movement sought was not so much rights for black
people as participation for them, participation in America. 22 Thus Charles Hamilton
Houston, the intellectual and professional dean of those great black lawyers, argued
that black law students from Missouri were being denied participation in their
professional community. 23 The practice, by the state of Missouri, of sending black
students to Nebraska to study law, instead of admitting them to Missouri's state law
school, made both of the ingredients essential to Dean Houston's argument, and did
so in terms of belonging. What Missouri did recognized membership and denied
participation.
Dean Houston said the practice deprived black law students of the dignity of
their citizenship because it denied them association with other students who would be
Missouri lawyers. Houston challenged the professional community Missouri's
lawyers had made, in which black lawyers could be of the fraternity but not in it, a
professional community which, as he put it, included black lawyers "by tolerance as
strangers and outsiders," 24 rather than as participants. His argument was an argument
about belonging.
In his effort to integrate railroad unions and to include black people in the
Tennessee Valley Authority, Dean Houston argued that Jeffersonian prosperity in
America would never be in any human sense possible if black people were excluded
from it. In gathering support for the historic school desegregation cases, he said "the
first item on any program for improvement of public schools for Negroes must be
convincing the mass of Negroes themselves that they are part of the public. . . .,,2
In their recent brief for economic justice, the Roman Catholic Bishops of the
United States argued from the suffering presence of the poor and the despised toward
a community in which the poor and the despised participate. Their argument
resembles Dean Houston's. "[S]ocial friendship and civic commitment . . . make
human moral and economic life possible," 26 they said. Friendship makes moral life
possible. "Social justice implies that persons have an obligation to be active and
productive participants ... and that society has a duty to enable them to participate
in this way.' '27 The Bishops said "[t]he ultimate injustice is for a person or group to
be actively treated ... as if they were non-members of the human race.''28
22. S. HOBBS, FROM rim SHOULDEaS OF HOUSTON: A VISION FOR SOCIAL AND ECoNOMIC JUsTIcE (1988) (unpublished
manuscript). This work will consider G.R. McNeil's 1983 biography of Houston, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton
Houston and the Struggle for Civil Rights, as well as speeches and essays that Dean Houston gave and wrote during the
busiest years of his career as an advocate.
23. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
24. S. HOBBS, FROM THE SHOULDERS OF HOUSTON: A VISION FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMuC JusTIcE (1988) (draft
manuscript) (quoting C. Houston).
25. G. McNEn., GROUNDWORK: CHARL.ES HAMILTON HOUSrON AND TH STUGGLE FOR CIviL RiGtts 141 (1983)
(quoting C.H. Houston).
26. United States Catholic Conference, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and
the U.S. Economy 34 (1986).
27. Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted).
28. Id. at 39.
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When Judge Harry T. Edwards gave the annual Tucker Lecture at Washington
& Lee University last year, he took "affirmative action" as his topic, a subject that
he has written and taught about for decades. At a faculty colloquium after the lecture,
one of my colleagues asked Judge Edwards about his goals for "affirmative action."
The judge said he thought of three goals-equality, involvement by members of
racial minority groups in the judgments society makes, and a community in which
people love one another. All three goals were, for him, a legal and professional
agenda-a jurisprudence and a professional ethic. These goals are also, I think, a
religious agenda, a political theology if you like. In any case, these goals have to do
with good persons living together; they do not have to do with isolation, and they
have less to do with choice than with belonging.
The religious vision here, the vision of the Hebraic tradition (the tradition of
Jews and Christians), points ultimately to a human community; it argues that
humanity is a family. I thought, when I heard Judge Edwards, of the Talmud and of
the Jewish tradition's interpretation of Genesis 2:7, which says that the Lord formed
the first human person "of the dust of the ground." The Rabbis taught that the dust
came from every part of the habitable earth, and so, as Rabbi Meir put it, people of
all lands and climes are brothers and sisters. We all belong to one family. But the
religious tradition will argue, as Judaism has always done, as Judge Edwards does,
and as the Catholic Bishops did in 1986, that first we belong to families and
neighborhoods and religious congregations; we belong to larger communities through
our organic communities, some of which are inevitable in our lives. We cannot not
belong to our organic communities, although we can deceive ourselves about
belonging. We are able to think about such a messianic abstraction as a worldwide
family of all persons only because we know, from remembering that we are members
of families and neighborhoods and religious congregations, what such a universal
brotherhood would be like.
II. THE LEGAL EThics OF COMMUNrrY
Chi lascia la via vecchia per la nuova, sa quel che perde e non sa quel che trova.29
In section I, I argued for two propositions. First, that professional ethics-legal
ethics-should turn from its obsession with autonomy and the rights of interchange-
able individuals, with acts, choices, and quandaries. Legal ethics should attempt
instead to describe and to teach to lawyers the classical ethics of the good person. And
second, that a neglected way for doing this would be to turn to each person's
emotional (pre-rational) sense of belonging somewhere, among a particular group of
people. I invoked to support the second point the anthropological and theological
perception that we explain what we do in terms of the communities we belong to.
Both of these propositions depart from the way legal ethics is "done" in university
law schools; both involve turning from one familiar fact to another familiar fact, from
29. Gambino, Italian Americans Today, in A DocutErtrARY HISTORY OF THE ITALIAN AMERcANs 428, 428 (W.
Moquin & C. Van Doren ed. 1974) ("Whoever forsakes the old way for the new knows what he is losing, but not what
he will find.").
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talking in school about "ethical dilemmas," to exploring the fact that each of us is
in a crowd that he is a member of.
I propose in this section to illustrate the arguments with one instance of such
familiar territory-the community and communities formed in this country within the
last century by Italian-American immigrants. I propose to try to describe that
community as a center of ethical explanation, to consider the fact that it has produced
lawyers who influence clients, professional ethics, and national policy, and, finally,
to wonder with you whether it makes a difference that these lawyers are Italian-
Americans.
I propose to consider what seems to me a quizzical outsider's look at one
Italian-American lawyer, a case where the Italian-American lawyer was, on a
conventional ethical assessment, a moral failure. I mean Mario Fabbri, of Louis
Auchincloss's short story The Fabbri Tape.30 Notice, before we take that look, that
the observer here, Louis Auchincloss, is a practicing lawyer and the principal inside
storyteller of the world of big-firm, modern, New York City lawyers. He is that and
also a giant in American letters-often referred to as the intellectual successor to
Henry James. Auchincloss is a W.A.S.P., very much a descendant of the two cultures
that support Wall Street law practice: the Puritan world that gave us American legal
ethics and the Wall Street law firm titans Auchincloss writes about, and the world of
old New York, which governs the business prosperity the law firms feed on.
Auchincloss views his Italian-American character from outside. And I am comment-
ing-theorizing-from outside. We are both students of Italian-American culture.
Neither of us is a member. 3 '
Mario Fabbri was the eldest of eight children in an Italian immigrant family. His
parents came to New York from Genoa in the 1880s, settled in New York, and
opened a family restaurant. 32 The Fabbri sons were destined, if they were typical, to
work in the family business or to take jobs as laborers under immigrant Irish work
bosses. The Fabbri daughters were destined to remain at home until they met other
Italian immigrants, in a proper and supervised way, and then were allowed to marry.
Mario Fabbri grew up in this way but he also grew into the Wall Street world.
The latter development was unusual. It happened because Mario's father was
atypically ambitious for his oldest son. Signor Fabbri became friendly with a
middle-aged bachelor who was also a Wall Street lawyer of solid Puritan credentials
and prosperity, and whose only fault was that he liked Italian food. The Wall Street
lawyer, Thomas Findlay, was the managing partner of his firm. He agreed, as a favor
to Signor Fabbri, to hire young Mario to be an office boy. Mario impressed Mr.
Findlay, and Mr. Findlay sent Mario to college, and then to law school, and made
him a clerk in the firm. 33 "Once I had a hand on the bottom rung of that ladder,"
30. L. Auchincloss, The Fabbri Tape, in NARCISSA AND OTHER FABLEs 149 (1983), and in T. SHArFR, ANIEs, cAN
LEGAL ETHics: TEXT, READINGS, AND DiscussIoN ToPics 599 (1985) [hereinafter Fabbri Tape].
31. 1 am grateful, of course, for advice from Italian and Italian-American students, colleagues, and friends, and the
advice of my remarkable daughter, Mary, who is a student of Italian culture and has spent most of the past three years
living and working in Italy. She is a graduate student at Johns Hopkins University.
32. Fabbri Tape, supra note 30, at 150-51.
33. Id. at 151.
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Mario said later, "I never loosened my hold." '34 He became an associate, then a
partner, and, in 1930, he succeeded Mr. Findlay as managing partner of the firm. 35
He was, for a little while, on the top of the heap.
This was an unusual ascent for an Italian boy. Few Italian boys left home in any
final way at all; few went to school long enough to qualify for college. They grew up
in an immigrant culture that was valiantly insular and distrustful of American
institutions. The culture Mario Fabbri came from did not believe in the American
dream. Contrary to the fond W.A.S.P. myth and to our rhetoric on the Fourth of July,
the Italians, and the other late immigrants, did not come here to escape oppression or
to take on a new, liberated way of life. They came, first, to survive and then, perhaps,
to find enough money to support their way of life. They were not leaving their
culture; they were trying to preserve it.36 They were taught from Old World memory,
particularly from Sicily and Southern Italy, that the way a community of people
survives is to take care of its own, to adhere to la via vecchia, the Old Way. 37 The
highest social value in that immigrant culture is the order of the family, the protection
of the family (l'ordine dellafamiglia). The principal tenet in the Old Way is respect
for your father-such deep respect that it would be an insult to him to achieve more
than he achieved, to rise higher in the world, even by the standards of the strange,
materialistic world of America.
Jewish immigrants of the period from 1890 to 1920 provide an illustrative
contrast in terms of interest in vertical mobility for children. Jews have advanced into
the professions more rapidly than any other late immigrant group. In 1970, seventy
percent of American Jewish males were in "professional, technical, managerial, and
administrative careers. "38 The comparable figure for Italian-Americans was about
twenty-six percent. 39 Italian-American income figures are relatively closer; Italians
have not had the best-paying jobs, but they have held their own on income, which
suggests that their relatively slower ascent to eminence has not been an aversion to
hard work, but rather a fear of cultural corruption, of assimilation.
In any case, Italians adhered to a way of life that turned less on status in the
larger American community than on acceptance and trust within their own immigrant
community. 40 The Jewish tradition has, like the Italian, emphasized the honor due
parents, but it teaches parents to work for the material advancement of their children;
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. An Italian friend said they left Italy because they were starving to death; they left to escape that nightmare. The
nightmare was not their culture but their poverty.
37. Letter from Mary Shaffer, Feb. 11, 1988 [hereinafter Letter]:
You emphasize la via vecchia. I would say that it includes tradition, not adhering consciously to a path which
you (the Italian) can visualize and follow, but rather doing things the way you've always traditionally done
them. Because it's the only way you know. Everyone here follows "the way" because it's the way they've
always done things. Deep down, I think, this gives Italians, whose country has always been in a precarious
position, a sense of security that they cling to. They need this built-in (internal) system of "security by routine,"
because they don't have much external security. Your daily habits are something you can always control, even
when you can't control the outside world. Italians are, for example, extremely formal, following a code of
manners which I think gives them structure and security, tells them how to behave.
38. R. PATAi, THE JEWsIt MiND 497 (1977).
39. H. Nau, FRoM IhDLucRANr To EmHNics: THE ITALtAN AMEaCAN S 185 (1983).
40. See generally id. at 173-93.
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it has not preserved the notion that a child who does well shames his father-a Jewish
father should seek a less burdensome life for his child than he seeks for himself, so
that the child will have time and energy to study the Torah. "Parental concern for the
well-being, development, studies, marriages, and careers of their children is,
unquestionably, more general and more intense among Jews than among any other
ethnic group," a fact that is due to the preservation of "the Jewish home environment
and... age-old traditional Jewish values."'41
Nor do Italians have the Anglo-American, utilitarian ethic that says it is a good
thing to get ahead. That ideal has been clearly expressed in American legal ethics
from early in the 19th century, in American culture from such popular sources as
Benjamin Franklin and Horatio Alger, and in English culture from the beginning of
the mercantile era. But the Italians did not and do not have it. Italians place value on
time spent well, on beauty, and on enjoying themselves-all the while observing a
decorous formality in dealing with one another. Those who came here eighty years
ago found that Americans mocked order; the language and bearing and manners of
Americans were unrefined. One immigrant, reflecting on how America looked to him
at first, said, "[d]ignity had no place in life." '42 The Italian immigrants found
turn-of-the-century American pragmatism crude and revolting. The immigrants'
diaries and letters home said of Americans that they were "colorless, unsalted...
without culture," 43 cold and unemotional. "[J]oy," one Italian said, "is a fruit that
the Americans eat green."44
Thomas Findlay, who was Mario Fabbri's Puritan patron and even surrogate
father in the law, did nothing but work. Mario said, of Findlay:
He was the most impersonal man I have ever known, a close-mouthed, hard-hitting, utterly
industrious Yankee. He lived, so far as I could make out, for the love of the law alone. He
never spent much money on himself, and he bequeathed the substantial fortune that he made
to a hospital in which he had shown only a perfunctory interest in his lifetime. 45
Mario, on the other hand, hardly realized how Italian he was when he admitted to
himself that he "craved pleasure as much as work. [He] loved music and art and food
and wine and women." 46
Mario and Mr. Findlay were nonetheless typical of the young and old lawyers
in Auchincloss's Wall Street fiction. Their relationship was defined by work. They
depended on one another-Findlay needed Mario's labor, and Mario was willing to
work hard, as Italians in this country have always been. And in that way, within the
limits of such industry, perhaps Mario and Findlay loved one another. I suspect Mario
would not have advanced so well if they had not loved one another.47
41. PATAi, supra note 38, at 496-97.
42. M. LASoRTE, LA MERICA: IMAGES OF ITALiAN GREENHORN EXPEIUENCE 147 (1985) (quoting C. PANUNZo, THE
SOUL OF AN IMMIGRANT 129 (1921)).
43. Id. (quoting P. DiDoNATo, TRmEE CiecIEs OF LIOHr 32 (1960)).
44. Id. (discussing E. CARNEvALi, AurOBIOGRAPHY OF EMANuEI CARNEvAU 160-70 (1967)).
45. Fabbri Tape, supra note 30, at 151.
46. Id.
47. For development of this theme, see L. AuctHicLoss, THE GREAT WORLD AND TioHny COLT (1956), and T.
SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL. Ermcs ch. 4 & 5 (1985).
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Even if the Fabbri family restaurant had made money, it was not likely that
Signor Fabbri would have sent his sons to law school. In any event, if the Fabbris
were typical of Italian immigrants before 1920, they did not make much money. They
found employment conditions almost as bad as they had been in Italy. They found a
steady and burdensome prejudice against Italians, and they found few opportunities.
Even those who came with skills, as Mario's father apparently did, could find no
openings for their skills. Those who had professional and technical training took jobs
as day laborers or, as the Fabbris eventually did, opened their own businesses.
Thousands of them, unlike the Fabbris, returned to Italy (some with savings, some
with none).
Both the economics of being in a large immigrant family in the 1890s and the
culture that Italians preserved in their tight immigrant community in America argued
against Mario Fabbri's being a lawyer. It was unlikely that his father could or would
have paid for a legal education for him; Mr. Findlay did that. But Wall Street was
even more unlikely than the Bar for a young man such as Fabbri. How did he get to
the top of the heap on Wall Street? Partly, of course, because Mr. Findlay liked him.
But, as Mario himself explained it, it was also because he did the thing that it was
least likely that the son of Italian immigrants would do-he repudiated his heritage.
If a young Italian-American lawyer wanted, as he put it,
to join the Union Club or the Piping Rock, if he wanted to send his sons to Groton or
Andover, if he hoped to be president of the American Bar Association or achieve high
federal office, it was going to be a lot easier for him if he became an Episcopalian and treated
his homeland as an exotic memory rather than a present-day inspiration.4-
Fabbri became an Episcopalian. He sent his children-a respectable, Protestant two
children-to the best schools. He joined the right clubs and assembled an enviable art
collection; he lived in a big house in Manhattan and gave opulent parties; he had what
he called "an agreeable and luxurious existence,"- 49 and all it cost him was his Italian
heritage.
Let me pause to underline how unlikely this was. But for the patronage of the
most powerful partner in the firm, Mario would never even have been hired as a law
clerk. Such firms in those days did not take associates who had not gone to the right
private boarding schools, and thence to Ivy League colleges and law schools. They
did not take Jews or Italians or even, for the most part, people with Irish surnames.
And it was not likely that the son of Italian immigrants would be at the Bar to
be considered for such a firm in the first place. Think, for example, of how long
Italians have been in this country in large numbers-about the same amount of time
as Eastern European Jews, the Irish, the Slavs, and many of the Germans. Then
consider how recent were the days when we first heard Italian names mentioned as
among those who held high office in government or business, or even in the Roman
Catholic Church. You did not hear names such as Iacocca mentioned among the
48. Fabbri Tape, supra note 30, at 153.
49. Id. at 155, 159.
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Fortune 500 corporations until Mr. Iacocca began to be noticed. Antonin Scalia is the
first Italian-American to sit on the Supreme Court.
John Pastore in 1946 became the first Italian-American elected governor of a state-Rhode
Island. In 1950 he became the first Italian-American elected to the United States Senate. In
1962, President Kennedy appointed Anthony J. Celebrezze... the first Italian-American to
hold cabinet rank in the federal government . . . . John A. Volpe, a former governor of
Massachusetts, was appointed Secretary of Transportation by President Nixon. In 1973,
Volpe, the son of immigrants from Abruzzi, became the first Italian-American ambassador
to Italy.50
This slow progress to eminence-there are still few Italians in positions of power
anywhere in America, even in the Catholic church-was not due entirely to
prejudice. Other late immigrant groups, notably the Eastern European Jews, the Irish,
and the Germans in and after World War I, have been subject to prejudice in America.
But the Italians did not trust American law and politics as much as the Jews and
Germans did, and they did not trust machine politics as much as the Irish did.51 They
trusted the Old Way; they feared the loss of their family order in the melting pot; they
had little faith in democratic pluralism; they held on to the Old Way, as many
Italian-Americans still do. In Mario Fabbri's day, they did not have the money to
send their children to law school but, even if they had had the money, they would not
have sent them. They knew that law school would turn their children into W.A.S.P.s,
as Mario Fabbri was turned into a W.A.S.P. They preferred to stay close to their
Little Italys and to preserve there the Old Way for their children, and their children
for the Old Way. 52
Mario Fabbri's story is a first-person narrative, given in widowed old age by
speaking into a tape recorder. He is provoked into the narrative by an investigative
reporter who has accused him of hubris. Mario's encounter with the investigative
reporter, and his making of the tape, are in 1975. Forty years prior to that, one
Gridley Forrest, a judge of the United States Court of Appeals in New York, was tried
and convicted of taking bribes.5 3 Mario Fabbri was exposed by the bar association as
implicated in Judge Forrest's crime, and resigned from the Bar to avoid disbarment.
In 1975, the reporter came upon the fact that Fabbri was still living, and tracked him
down and talked to him about the Forrest case.
The reporter discovered to his unlikely amazement that Mario was not repentant
50. R. GAMBINO, BLOOD OF MY BLOOD: THE DILEMMA OF THE ITALIAN-AMERIcANS 293 (1974).
51. See generally NELI, supra note 39, at 173-93. A third factor is involved, in addition to prejudice and
insularity. That factor is the Italian preference for using close to home the money they eventually accumulated, using it
for houses and businesses they would own and not rent and for the needs of their extended families in this country and
in Italy. A significant number of second-generation Italian-Americans were brought into American higher education after
World War H by the G.I. Bill, which made it possible for veterans both to own a house or business and have a college
education.
52. I do not mean to imply that other late-immigrant groups did not preserve their culture, but that the Italians had
their own way of doing it. The Eastern European Jews, again, are a contrast. The culture and career of the entertainment
lawyer Fanny Holtzmann is an example. T. BEr.wmAN, THE LADY AND THE LAw: THE REmARKABLE LIFE OF FANrr
HOLTZMAr1 (1976); Harriman, "Miss Fixit," The New Yorker, Jan. 30, 1937, at 21, and Feb. 6, 1937, at 22, in T.
SHAFRm, AMsmucAN LEOAL ETmcs 624 (1985).
53. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938), perhaps suggested a plot to Auchincloss. See J.
NOONAN, BRIBES 567-72 (1984).
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for what he had done: "Fabbri, hale and hearty at eighty-four, sole survivor of a
scandal that four decades ago shook our bar from coast to coast," the reporter wrote,
"cheerfully persists in his ancient error. 'Believing what I then believed to be the
facts,' he told a reporter recently, 'I'd do the same thing again.' -54
"It's perfectly true. I would," Fabbri says into the tape recorder. "But it
behooves me, I suppose, in an era of general review of moral values, to make some
effort to set down my reasons for the benefit of any posterity that cares to hear
them." 55 The Fabbri tape is a moral explanation-the sort of thing that Carol
Greenhouse put into her tape recorder in Georgia when she talked to Baptists about
dispute resolution. I want to argue that the Fabbri tape is also a case of the sort
Greenhouse describes in which explanation is a claim of belonging, and in which
belonging is where morals come from. Fabbri's explanation reveals that he belongs
to the community he thought he had renounced; it is an Italian-American's
explanation. And this even though he thinks his explanation comes from the
community he thought he chose when he renounced the Old Way. In other words, I
want to say that Fabbri was not as able to choose the community he belonged to as
he thought he was. He belonged to the community he thought he had left. He did not
belong to the community he thought he had chosen.5 6
Mario explains, as he talks into the tape recorder, that he became managing
partner of the law firm in 1930; by 1935 he had reached the social and economic
pinnacle, symbolized by his election to the Greenvale Country Club in 1934 and by
his growing friendship with Judge Forrest. Judge Forrest was arrogant and ambitious,
industrious and clever; he was the sort of man Wall Street expected to be on the
federal Supreme Court eventually; and, as he assessed his own abilities, he thought
he would have been there but for the fact that President Franklin D. Roosevelt would
not nominate such a person for that court.
Mario was prosperous and at least apparently confident and able-or so he
thought-to meet the judge on equal ground. The equal ground was the country club.
[E]lection to this club was the social triumph of my life.... I enjoyed it just as much as,
during my two years on the waiting list, I had thought I should. I loved the big white shiny
clubhouse, always so freshly painted, with its porticos overlooking the great green stretch of
the golf course.. .; the huge sapphire swimming pool; the grass courts; the smart women
in tennis clothes .... My son, Tom, said that I liked it because it looked like a Packard
advertisement.-s
Mario and the judge met at this place on Saturdays, played golf there, and then
had lunch together in the big white shiny clubhouse. They talked of inside matters in
the judge's court and of inside matters among Mario's business clients. The judge
54. Fabbri Tape, supra note 30, at 149.
55. Id.
56. 1 mean to quarrel here with Greenhouse's tendency to imply that a person chooses his explanation and thereby
chooses his community, as he might choose a brand of beer or a used car. There is, in my view, much less choice, and
much less of a quandary behind the choice, than Greenhouse and the anthropologists she relies on suppose; there is much
less choice, too, than existentialist philosophy, in its attempt to account for relationship and community, implies. See D.
CARR, TtE, NARs.m'iE, ANE HISTORY 100-52 (1986).
57. Fabbri Tape, supra note 30, at 158-59.
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learned facts he could use in his investments; the lawyer learned useful facts about the
federal judiciary. "I was perfectly aware that I was being pumped, but I had no
objection. Was I not, in my own way, pumping him?" 58
Mario tells his tape recorder that the judge discovered Mario's moral vulnera-
bility. "Gridley Forrest, I sometimes think, was put on this earth to destroy me, the
one being equipped by a malign creator with the apparatus fatal to my defenses, as
the mongoose is to the cobra or the desert wasp to the tarantula. ' 59 The judge
discovered Mario's vulnerability during the lunches at the country club. What
happened at lunch was a familiar thing in immigrant groups-the making of a deal,
a trade or "the game," as an Italian-American friend put it. One characteristic
description of the immigrant groups, with their community life, their ward politics,
their gradual claim on political power in American cities, was that they made deals.
This was characteristic of the Italians, as it was of the Irish; think of The Last Hurrah,
George V. Higgins's political novels, or the stories about the late Mayor Richard
Daley. Deals had a somewhat different object in the Italian community. They were
essential to that community's integrity, and particularly to a negotiated peaceful
coexistence within the larger society. (Think of O'Connor's Mayor Skeffmgton in the
Columbus Day Parade in Boston, or helping to bless a statue of Mother Cabrini.)
The immigrant groups did not understand this deal-making to be morally
questionable; they did not glamorize political power with moral rhetoric; and they
understood that government is a matter of compromise. 6° An immigrant lawyer
would enter into deal-making as into any other professional activity; if Mario Fabbri
had been an entirely self-conscious Italian-American, trading business information
for judicial information would not have been morally troublesome to him. In this he
was an Italian-American, even when he was not conscious of being one. (What
Italian-American in 1935 would, after all, have been sitting in the dining room of a
private club that it took two years of waiting for a Wall Street lawyer to get into?)
But-my theory continues-Judge Forrest thought this information swapping to
be morally questionable. He had a W.A.S.P.'s conscience about it. The fact that
Mario appeared not to have qualms made the judge contemptuous of him, as people
of the judge's class were contemptuous of the way Italians dressed, washed, ate, and
raised their children. My guess is that the judge began to discover Mario's
vulnerability at these Saturday lunches. The "apparatus fatal to my defenses" 61 that
Mario later talked about was that Judge Forrest noticed that Fabbri really was an
Italian. Mario did not see that-at least not then. The judge saw it, and he stored the
discovery away for future use. When the time came for him to put that information
to use, as he might have used information on securities that he got from Mario at
lunch, he took it out, and he made his play.
The judge's play was this. One Saturday at lunch at the club he told Mario that
he had taken a bribe in a patent case. There were three judges on the court hearing
58. Id. at 159.
59. Id. at 157.
60. M. NovAK, IN PRAISE OF CYNICISM (OR) WHEN THE SAINT GO MARCHING Our (1977).
61. Fabbri Tape, supra note 30, at 157.
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the patent appeal. One of them was adamant to reverse the district court's judgment;
Judge Forrest had taken the bribe to affirm it. That left the third appellate judge and
Forrest needed to get that judge's vote. If he failed to get it, he said, the person paying
the bribe would expose Judge Forrest. He needed Mario's help in writing a draft
opinion that would persuade this third, unbribed judge. He turned to Mario because
Mario was vulnerable and was also a good lawyer, especially persuasive in patent
cases. "Will you help me?" the judge said. "If not for my sake, for the reputation
of the bench?" 62 Mario said to his tape recorder, forty years later, "I gazed at him
in surprise. Then I nodded. 'For your sake, Gridley.' "63
Mario did help him. The bribery came to light; it turned out, in fact, that the
judge was taking bribes in other cases. Mario was implicated in the patent-case
bribery and resigned from the Bar. His wife left him for a while, then returned, and
then died. Mario made a little money in the real estate business and otherwise lived
off the proceeds of the sale of his art collection. Forty years later the reporter tracked
him down and found out that he was not repentant-Mario said he would do it again.
The tape was taking down Mario's reasons.
His reasons, he said, were patriotic.
I... felt some still unsettled debt to the great nation that had rescued my family from the
sad poverty of its origin. I had believed in the American system, in hard work, in getting
ahead, in a society that at least tried to be fair to the individual if that individual had some
respect for it. I had prospered... and now there was something I could do to show my
gratitude.64
Wasn't this a cover-up? Yes, he told the tape recorder. But "[wiho knows how many
of the heroes and inspiring events of our history do not owe some of their luster to
cover-ups?" 65 Even Watergate, he said, "[siupposing . . .it had been possible to
cover up the Watergate break-in and spare the world a knowledge that has
disillusioned millions .... Would you not have done so?" 66
That is a W.A.S.P.'s explanation for behavior. On Carol Greenhouse's account
it is a claim by Mario Fabbri to belong to the dominant American society. It is the
claim of an American republican lawyer. 67 To claim that ethic is to claim the
community of American gentlemen-lawyers, the moral titans who depend on integrity
and honor to assure probity in what they do for their clients and for their country. It
was the sort of moral identification the late immigrants distrusted. But it was an
altogether admirable moral tradition. We have all been taught to admire it. Atticus
Finch, of Harper Lee's remarkably popular story, To Kill a Mockingbird, is such a
62. Id. at 162.
63. Id. (emphasis in original).
64. Id. at 164-65.
65. Id. at 165.
66. Id.
67. See Adversary Ethic, supra note 6. The republican-lawyer tradition in America is probably still our dominant
professional ethic. It was stated in the Fifty Resolutions on Professional Deportment, in 1836, by the Baltimore lawyer
and law professor, David Hoffman, and restated in the next generation by George Sharswood, founding dean of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School and chief justice of Pennsylvania. It found its way into the fist codes of legal
ethics in the 1880s, even though it was, in the codes, substantially colored by a new adversary ethic that Wall Street
lawyers had invented to defend their involvement with the robber barons.
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gentleman-lawyer. So is Gavin Stevens, of Faulkner's Snopes stories. So are the
Boston lawyers who occasionally appear in the novels of William Dean Howells,
and, more to the present point, the Yankee partners that populate Auchincloss's Wall
Street lawyer stories.
The republican gentleman-lawyer decides what is best for himself, for his
clients, and for his country. He does not make a fetish of moral rules. Shirley Letwin
says of him that he will lie to protect his friend, but he will not pretend that he has
not lied.68 He will surely lie to protect his country, too. And he does think of it as his
country-partly, I suppose, because his fraternity has always controlled it. The
explanation that claims membership in this gentleman-lawyer's community also
claims power. That, I think, was the moral defense that Mario Fabbri thought he was
speaking into his tape recorder-a gentleman-lawyer might well decide that a
cover-up would be best. Mario was claiming to be in the community other Wall Street
lawyers came from, and to be surprisingly unrepentant. It was the sort of claim he
expected to make after he became an Episcopalian and decided to regard his Italian
heritage as an exotic memory.
Was Mario's appropriation of that republican mantle the vulnerability that Judge
Forrest sensed in him? I wonder if the judge supposed that the way he could get Mario
to help him in his bribery scheme was to appeal to his American patriotism-if you
do not help me, Mario, the federal judiciary will be brought into disrepute, and that
will be bad for the administration of justice. If that were the judge's play, why did
he choose Mario? Why didn't he go to a graduate of the private schools, the Ivy
League colleges, the better law schools? Why didn't he seek out the Puritan pedigree
that most of Auchincloss's lawyers have, and make his pitch there?
The answer, I think, is that American patriotism would not have persuaded a
republican gentleman-lawyer 69 and was not the judge's sense of how he could get to
Mario Fabbri. I think Forrest depended on the fact that Fabbri was Italian. The way
to get to him was to appeal to him as an Italian. And that meant appealing to him as
a friend-not as a patriot, a defender of the administration of American justice, a
gentleman-lawyer, but as a friend. That is why he put the choice of moral reasons to
Mario-do it for my sake, or for the sake of the reputation of the bench. And Mario
said, as the judge knew he would: "For your sake, Gridley." 70
Mario, looking back after forty years, thinks he chose to defend the honor of the
bench; it appears, on Carol Greenhouse's account, that he thus chooses the
explanation that shows him to be a gentleman and a republican lawyer. But in fact,
68. S. L-wN, TrE GENmtEAN iN ToLLoPE: INDIvIDuALTrY AND MORAL CONDucT (1982).
69. See NovA, supra note 60, at 7:
Thus in 1973 Elliott Richardson and Archibald Cox were indispensable to the plan to give Richard Nixon a clean
bill of health. Their firing fulfilled the myths of the high civil religion: they were proven "incorruptible." All
of Elliott Richardson's earlier pragmatic compromises in every office in which he served under Richard Nixon
might have exhausted the moral capital of a member of any other civil religion and destroyed him politically.
They were long tolerated in Richardson, and his single refusal to obey Nixon won him not only total forgiveness
but future power. "You won't believe this," Mr. Richardson later told a reporter, "but it was the easiest
decision of my life." (I believe it.)
See also Novak, Catholics and Power, Notre Dame Mag., Feb. 1980, at 12. Both are excerpted in T. SHAFrrR, AEmRucAN
LEGAL ETmcs 584, 586, 594 (1985).
70. Fabbri Tape, supra note 30, at 162 (emphasis in original).
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and despite a lifetime of alienation, Mario's tape-recorded explanation shows him to
be, still, and even so, in his Italian-American community, the community that takes
care of its own, that learned over centuries of coping with powerful outsiders to keep
its children close to its breast, to follow the order of the family, and to adhere to the
Old Way in the new world.
Mario says, at the end of the tape, that the disgrace of the late 1930s caused his
son (whose name is Tomaso) to renounce him. Tom even changed his last name,
maybe to something like "Forrest." "He detested my crime and deplored my
intransigence; he saw no alternative but to cut himself off from me forever... God
bless him," 71 Mario says. But Mario's daughter, Alma, stayed with her father.
"Alma accepted me and my crime .... Her children are almost cozy with me; they
think I was a 'victim of my time,' "72 he says. "Alma has a comfortable theory that
I was confused between an Italian Catholic upbringing and something she calls 'the
Protestant ethic' . .. . I am considered virtually without blame, a dear old wop
grandpa who is not to be taken quite seriously. ' 7 3 And so, in the end, Mario is an
Italian whether he likes it or not. My guess is that he was an Italian all along.
There is an ethical irony in the story that might interest you, even if my analysis
of Judge Forrest's hold on Mario does not. And that is that the official ethics of the
Bar gave Mario a way to avoid "unethical" behavior in this case, a way that Mario
must have known about but did not take.
The legal ethics of the Wall Street firms in the days of Mario Fabbri's glory
were, as they are now, remarkably ambivalent. On the one hand they proclaimed the
traditions of the 19th century, some of which came through the official histories of
their law firms. These are republican traditions-the gentleman-l wyer decides what
is best; he is faithful to his client, but he does what is best for his country; he gives
moral leadership to his business clients. On the other hand, the law firms had to come
to terms with the fact that their prosperity had been dependent on representation of the
robber barons, who bribed, stole, and even murdered their way to power in the last
third of the 19th century. 74
The ambivalence is expressed in the codes. The codes are republican in their
claims for the profession, but they also enshrine the adversary ethic that says a lawyer
is dispensed from the conventional morals of complicity-a lawyer is not responsible
for what his client does. The firms support both republican professional rhetoric and
the convenient regulatory rules that do not require a lawyer to answer for the
consequences of what he does for clients.
The code that was used, in this ambivalent way, to govern lawyer behavior in
New York in the 1930s gave Mario Fabbri a way to help Judge Forrest without getting
into trouble. Entry into the lawyer's "ethical" enclave required two familiar steps.
The first is confidentiality. If the judge had been Mario's client, rather than his fellow
71. Id. at 169.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Adversary Ethic, supra note 6. The history of the adversary ethic in the New York City law firms of the
1870s is probably like the history of dispute resolution among the Baptists Greenhouse describes. The Baptists say their
ancestors lived in harmony, as the Wall Street lawyers say their ancestors followed the traditional ethic of the adversary.
1988]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
lawyer, there would have been no duty to report what he knew about what the judge
had done. The bribe was paid; the issue the judge presented at lunch was avoiding
disclosure of the bribe. The conventional legal ethics of confidentiality would have
protected Mario from blame for not disclosing the bribe his client took; the rules of
the Bar would have imposed on him a duty not to disclose it. It would have been
unethical for Mario to report the judge if the judge had been his client.
All that would have been necessary, for this first step, would have been for
Mario to say, early in the conversation at the country club: "You're my client-
right?" The public-and, I suppose, the immigrant communities-do not understand
that principle of confidentiality, particularly in compelling cases such as this one, or
the Lake Placid buried-bodies case; but the Bar is resolute in upholding it.
Confidentiality is a matter of professional honor; it is our seal of the confessional. 75
The second step is Mario's drafting the opinion in the patent case. I suppose
many who work in legal ethics would disagree with me (my students often do), but
I think that, too, could have been worked out under the lawyer's code. There is no
"ethical" rule against ghost-writing judicial opinions. Nor is there a rule against
using one's learning and craftsmanship for a cause one does not believe in; that is,
after all, the essence of the adversary ethic. Mario wrote an opinion that Judge Forrest
thought was sound. It was the result the judge thought should have been reached; he
said so, to Mario, before he admitted he was bribed to reach that result. But, Mario
says, "I did not even try to persuade myself that it made any difference that the brief
I was writing might have been submitted with perfect propriety by counsel for the
litigant for whom I was indirectly working," ' 76 or that it could, without "ethical"
difficulty, have been written for Judge Forrest.
Although Mario Fabbri told himself that what he was doing was "only
elementary decency . . morally right,'"77 he refused to take advantage of routine
American-lawyer casuistry, under the provisions of an adversary ethic his forebears
on Wall Street had invented and had learned to defend. And that, I think, is an irony.
It is as if Mario preferred to stake out his republican moral claim when he did not have
to do so, when he might have taken refuge in the canons of his craft. Perhaps, if he
had been candid with himself, had admitted to himself that what he was doing was
helping a friend, he might have been more willing to defend himself with the weapons
that were at hand. 78 Perhaps he would not, as if he were a good Puritan, have so
quickly admitted his guilt, and then refused, as a good Italian, to feel guilty about it.
Perhaps it was Mario's confusion about his own morals-his inability to spell out his
75. Letter, supra note 37:
I don't think Italians would ever expect to be covered, insured, or saved by a confidentiality nile. It's such an
American idea. Even if it existed here, no one would place any faith in it, and therefore take risks, thinking that
this principle would protect them. Italians place their faith in what they can see and actually put their hands on.
Possession is ten-tenths of the law here.
76. Fabbri Tape, supra note 30, at 164.
77. Id.
78. Jerry Kennedy, George V. Higgins's Boston-Irish street-crimes defense lawyer, would have helped his friend
and used the code, as he would put it, to protect his "ticket." See G. HiGtiNs, KENNEDY FOR THE DE ENsE (1980) (Kennedy
protects Cadillac Teddy Franklin, a car thief); G. HiGkiNs, PENANCE FOR JERRY KENNEDY (1985) (Kennedy protects Lou
Schwartz, accountant for the Mafia). See also T. SHtArFmR, FArr AND THE PROFEssIONs ch. 5 (1987).
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ethic, to see his community-that got him into trouble. If he had been able either to
be an Italian-American lawyer who took his morals from the Old Way, or a
republican gentleman-lawyer, he would have worked his way through the Forrest
case with less disaster.
III. CONCLUSION
If you are like my students, when they reach this point in the part of the course
that has to do with the late-immigrant lawyers, you are annoyed because it is not clear
what I am getting at. My students expect too much. Maybe you do, too.
If I have been entirely successful here, I will leave you with a quizzical curiosity
about the effects our communities have on our morals as lawyers. That is all I have
aimed to do-to suggest a more or less logical (or at least, I hope, rational) argument,
in ethics, for turning to explanations as a way to understand moral behavior, and from
there to the fact that, in making explanations, a person identifies his community. I
have tried to illustrate these suggestions with a look at an American community that
has a relatively clear heritage, one that is, thus far, relatively well preserved and also
neglected in academic ethics. The most I can hope for, by way of reaction from you
who have put up with this, is that you are left wondering if there might be something
to it.
To the extent that there is something to it, the profession's reliance on abstract
moral quandaries, and on a philosophy that makes persons interchangeable, is
weakened; and the possibility that those who "do" ethics in our profession might
turn to the ethics of the good person is made more likely. That would be enough for
me.
The narrower agenda-the study of discrete moral cultures as a way to suggest
an American legal ethic of the good person-is something I hope to do more work on
and something I invite other lawyers to work on and think about. I can say a couple
of things about what I think such a project will show.
First, it will not support liberal notions of democratic pluralism. I do not aspire
to support either the philosophy of the melting pot or the political project of those who
want to synthesize ethnic heritages in America. Both of these liberal agendas are
suggested in the scholarship and bright prose of Michael Novak, who provoked my
own study and teaching in this area. It is his hope that all of our moral heritages will
affect each American for the better; he hopes, he says, for a moral, civic, and
religious synthesis-each of us will get a little Italian dignity, a little Teutonic
stoicism, a bit of Latin American warmth, and some Puritan guilt to hold us together.
Down deep, I think, that philosophy of our history hopes that ethnic, cultural, and
religious differences will fade away, that we will all become alike, and that the thing
we will be when we are all alike will be a mixture of Benjamin Franklin and Abraham
Lincoln. There will be nothing Italian or Irish or African or Mexican left. We will all
have learned to eat our fruit green.
Second, it will not be an ethic that exalts autonomy, the philosophy that regards
each person as his own tyrant. The implication I find in Greenhouse's helpful
scholarship, and in the liberal ethical theory one finds among the followers of H.R.
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Niebuhr, involves too much emphasis on choosing. As I perceive the force of moral
culture in my life, the lives of my students and other friends, and the lives I read about
in good American stories, moral culture precedes the choice of moral culture. It is
certainly the case that choice is involved in our morals. We are able to be responsible.
We are accountable for what we do. But usually, as Augie March implied, we choose
what we already are. Sound choice is not ordinarily so much a matter of a new
direction as it is a matter of coming home.
It is the case that a person is able to remove herself from the culture she was bom
into-but the voyage is unlikely, difficult, and perilous.7 9 If she were a friend of mine,
I would think of Mario Fabbri and advise her not to try. More to the point I have been
trying to make here, I would suggest to her that she will probably be in her old moral
world when she thinks she has moved to a new moral world. What this means for me
as a teacher of legal ethics is that I suggest to my students that the morals they disclose
in practicing our profession have their roots at home-not in the profession, not in
conventional American patriotism, certainly not in the law, but in where they came
from. My teaching will then be an invitation to "spell out engagements" 80 (as Herbert
Fingarette puts it) with clear sight, with courage, and finally with pride. 81
79. Letter, supra note 37: "She arrives and remains always a bit unsure of herself, lacking the solid base which
develops before one can consciously choose it, and which supplies her 'gut' feelings when the time comes to make a
choice or decision."
80. See generally H. FNGoARrm, SEaF-DEcr.noN (1969).
81. The contemporary American writer who says this best is Anne Tyler. She has not yet written about lawyers;
I hope she will. Her stories are stories of people who get together-who both are and become families-because they find
a way to come home, or not to leave. In The Tin Can Tree (1965), Tyler's symbol is a narrow two-story building a mile
from Larksville, North Carolina. The person who built the building expected Larksville to grow and surround the building,
but Larksville did not grow. The building sits all by itself on a dusty road about a mile from town.
The building is divided into three dwellings, "its three chimneys jumbled tightly together with the smoke
intermingling in wintertime." Id. at 8. The people who live in the dwellings are involved with one another even as each
group of them tries in feeble ways to be independent of the other two. In the story they are involved in grieving over the
sudden, accidental death of a child.
When Joan, the heroine of the story and the child's cousin, leaves, carrying her suitcases to the bus station in town,
she walks "with that sudden light, lost feeling that came from walking in a straight line away from people she loved."
Id. at 220. Joan returns on a night when all the other neighbors are gathered in the apartment on the left end. The lights
are turned on there because the neighbors are having a party-a party that marks the end of their communal grieving for
the dead child. "(I]t looked as if someone had tipped the house endwise so that everyone had slid down to James's
parlor." Id. at 261. And, of course, everyone had. In Tyler's stories, people come home in that way. Joan joins the party
and ends up being the one who takes a picture of the residents as they sit on and around a couch in James's parlor
In the finder of the camera Joan could see them moving, each person making his own set of motions. But the
glass of the finder seemed to hold them there, like figures in a snowflurry paperweight who would still be in
their set positions when the snow settled down again. She thought whole years could pass, they could be born
and die, they could leave and return, they could marry or live out their separate lives alone, and nothing in this
finder would change. They were going to stay this way, she and all the rest of them, not because of anyone else
but because it was what they would keep a strong tight hold of.
Id. at 269-70.
